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Discussion After the Speech of S. Linn Williams
QUESTION, Professor King- Curiosity has consumed me about
the experience in the machine tool industry. I recently read about the
plight of an upstate New York machine tool manufacturer that had
given its technology to a Japanese company and then were subse-
quently targeted out of existence.
What about targeting as a device for Japanese industrial policy? Is
that old hat or does it still continue to be important? What about the
machine tool producers?
ANSWER, Mr. Williams: Machine tools have been one of the
success stories in Japanese sectoral policy. Targeting is still a practice
that is followed, not only by MITI, but also by the Ministry of Trans-
portation and other ministries. Again, the success rate is not high. Ma-
chine tools is one where it has been.
QUESTION, Mr. Elliott: My question has to do with the advisory
committee that you mentioned in MITI. We often interpret other
structures in other countries in terms of our own cultural assumptions,
and I think Americans generally regard MITI sectoral policies as the
government directing industry.
My question is to what extent is it really the other way around?
To what extent, through the institutions of these industrial advisory
committees, are the Japanese industrial companies participaiing coop-
eratively with the government in defining policies on the one hand and,
on the other hand, to what extent is the government independently di-
recting industry?
ANSWER, Mr. Williams: The advisory committees have worked
much more to assert the influence of the private sector on the govern-
ment rather than the other way around. This comes up often. As a
relatively recent example, we negotiated an agreement on telecommuni-
cations in 1990 which had various components to it. The Japanese Gov-
ernment proceeded to form an advisory committee made up entirely of
Japanese companies, including the regulated companies. They then
proceeded to develop a regulation that was completely wrong, because
the industry put its stamp on the government. That is a large part of
the function of an advisory committee. It is not the purpose of this talk
to discuss American industrial policy, which, I think, can be an intel-
lectually interesting subject. However, when one looks to what an
American industrial policy might be, I think there are great risks in
borrowing what one sees in Japan. It has not been terribly successful on
the whole, as my talk has indicated. Even in areas which I did not
cover in the paper that have been successful in Japan - the closure of
markets,' cooperation and consensus building -- I think reasonable
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people can wonder whether it would work very well in this environ-
ment. It seems to me that a much better indicator of how industrial
policy might work for America is Europe. While that is also not a sub-
ject of my talk, I would submit that European industrial policy has
produced not one single world-class good -- with the exception of air-
planes, which was a monopolistic market.
QUESTION, Mr. Rosenthal: I had the impression that in recent
years MITI has become much more free trade oriented in the manufac-
turing sector. In December it was MITI which lobbied through the new
stiffer penalties of the competition law in Japan much more effectively
than the Japan Fair Trade Commission. My impression is that the pro-
tected sectors are the sectors that MITI does not have control over, and
that the problem is more with the Ministry of Finance.
You talked about the guidance, the cartelization of the Japanese
financial markets, the Transportation Ministry, the Agricultural Minis-
try, the Structural Ministry, and telecommunications. These are the
ministries that are still playing much more by the traditional ideas that
do not have MITI's incentives to open the Japanese market because,
unlike MITI, they are not so concerned about exports and the tradeoff
between the two.
Would you say that is a fair perception?
ANSWER, Mr. Williams: I would. Actually, since I have been in
the private sector helping private companies get into the Japanese mar-
ket I have gone more than once to people I know at MITI in order to
get into the market. For those of you to whom this does not make
sense, go back to something I said in the speech. In order to understand
what a Japanese bureaucracy does, you have to interpret it in light of
its relationship to other Japanese bureaucracies. If you are a young
intelligent official of MITI, nobody needs you to export anymore. In
fact, in the semiconductor agreement we gave MITI more authority
over the electronics companies than it had in twenty years as a way to
implement the semiconductor agreement. If you are a MITI official,
your power within the government is on the import side because that is
where you are needed; and, therefore, it is MITI that has led the way
on many of these imports. The Large Retail Store Act was a MITI-
administered law, but it is also MITI that made the major changes.
It is not in the Japanese way of doing things to change without
influence from someone; and, unfortunately, that has tended to come
from outside and from us. But once influenced, it is MITI that is prob-
ably the most open part of the Japanese Government now in my
experience.
QUESTION, Mr. Rosenthal: If you will just permit me a follow-
up question to build on what you just said. I then find it fascinating, if
that is your perception, too, that MITI seems to be so hostile to
Canter's proposal for managed trade as the long-term solution to U.S.-
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Japan trade -problems in the future. It would seem to me that managed
trade would give MITI the very control over the sectors, which it is not
likely to have otherwise, and that the MITI bureaucracy ought to be
seizing on it. It would seem almost as if it is now our success in export-
ing our free trade orientation that makes MITI weary about managed
trade much more so than, at the moment, our U.S. trade
representatives.
ANSWER, Mr. Williams: I think they would probably appreciate
the power, but they would probably also appreciate the sort of lunacy
of the suggestion.
How do you start managed trade and where do you stop it? If the
Japanese concede that we are entitled to percentages of their markets,
much like nineteenth century China, the Europeans will not be far be-
hind. Nor will the Canadians or the Koreans. It is a very slippery slope.
Focusing on ways in which these systems can be more like one another
is more constructive. If most people believe that there are three kinds
of capitalism, and that they are competing and incompatible, then the
only logical solution is managed markets. Therefore, in order to keep
the system from doing something truly foolish like managing markets,
it is extremely important that the systems begin to look more like one
another, especially in areas like competition policy, investment and so
on. Again, Japan has the most catching up to do.
QUESTION, Mr. Erdilek: I wanted to ask you about direct quote
investment. You indicated that the Japanese have not only restricted
market access to foreign exporters, but they also restricted direct quote
investment. You also indicated that the U.S., and to a large extent Eu-
rope, have been open to direct quote investment. However, I wanted to
observe that much of direct quote investment by the Japanese in the
United States has been stimulated, to a large extent, by the restrictions
that we have put on their exports to the U.S. market.
To what extent have the direct quote investment restrictions in Ja-
pan been beneficial in terms of the industrial policy? It is said that they
emphasize importing foreign technology through licensing agreements
as opposed to direct quote investment. However, much of their direct
quote investment literature says that direct quote investment brings in
new technology, which is beneficial to the economy. In the case of Ja-
pan, it would seem to me that by restricting their direct quote invest-
ment they actually suffer the cost of not having that kind of involved
technology. What is your judgment on that?
ANSWER, Mr. Williams: On the inflows, there are some indus-
tries, for example, that are looking for investment; machine tools being
one. If you did not like Japanese investment and wanted to pick two
areas where they would do the least harm to the economy, you would
probably pick real estate and movies, which is exactly where the Japa-
nese moved in. There is an over-reaction to a lot of the investment.
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I am not sure I agree with you that it is a fear of restrictions on
their imports that have moved Japanese into investing here. I would
tend to think it is more an assessment of cost, or at least as much an
assessment of cost, because Japanese manufacturing is generally mov-
ing overseas at a faster pace now than ours is.
On Japanese investment, I agree with you that Japanese restric-
tions on foreign policy ultimately hurt them. However, the fact that
Japanese restrictions on investment have been bad for Japan should not
lead one to be any less assertive to get rid of their restrictions, because
somewhere between twenty to seventy percent of trade follows invest-
ment, depending on the sector and other factors.
One of the things that people do not talk about much in Japan is
investment, but unless American companies are investors in the Japa-
nese market they will not be major players there. Unless they are ma-
jor players in the world's second biggest market, globalization will not
work in their favor.
Investment is a big element of diversification of the 1990s. And,
again, Japan has the most catching up to do.
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